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Abstract This paper proposes an analysis of Cuzco Quechua evidentials within the
possible worlds framework developed by Kratzer (1981, 1987, 2010), and explores
how the tools provided by this framework can be used to best capture their evidential
and epistemic modal aspects. In particular, it will be discussed how differences
between evidentials can be accounted for by different restrictions on the modal base
and ordering source.
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1 Introduction
In the formal literature on evidentiality it is often assumed that evidentials can be
analyzed as epistemic modals with an evidential presupposition within Kratzer’s
(1981; 1987) framework of possible worlds semantics, see, for example, the seminal
work by Izvorski (1997) and subsequent work such as Ehrich 2001, Matthewson,
Davis & Rullmann 2007 and Rullmann, Matthewson, & Davis 2008. This paper
explores how the tools provided by this framework can be used to best capture the
evidential and epistemic modal aspects of the evidentials of Cuzco Quechua (CQ). In
particular, it will be discussed how differences between evidentials can be accounted
for by different restrictions on the modal base and ordering source. The discussion
contributes to the ongoing debate about whether evidentials can be subsumed under
the category of epistemic modals.
The remainder of this introduction provides background on evidentiality and
epistemic modality as well as Cuzco Quechua. In section 2, the use and meaning
of CQ evidentials will be described and illustrated. Section 3 summarizes the main
relevant points of Kratzer’s (1981; 1987) account of (epistemic) modality, and its
application to evidentials in the literature. Section 4 builds on these previous accounts
and proposes modifications to capture the differences between the CQ evidentials.
The main proposal is that inferential evidentials rely on an ordering source, whereas
non-inferential evidentials constrain the modal base.
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Cuzco Quechua evidentials
1.1 Evidentiality and epistemic modality
Evidentiality and epistemic modality are closely related yet distinct conceptual
categories (Aikhenvald & Dixon 2003; Faller 2002; de Haan 1999). Epistemic
modality marks the speaker’s degree of certainty or the necessity/possibility of the
truth of the proposition expressed by p. For example, the CQ enclitic -puni in (1a)
expresses that the speaker is certain to a high degree that it rained, while the English
modal might in (1b) expresses that the speaker considers this a possibility.1
(1) a. Para-mu-sha-rqa-n=puni.
rain-CISL-PROG-PST-3=CERT
(Cuzco Quechua)
‘It was certainly raining.’
b. It might have been raining.
Evidentiality, in contrast, indicates the speaker’s type of source of information
for p (in assertions). For example, the CQ enclitic =mi in (2a) indicates that the
speaker saw that it was raining, and the German modal verb sollen in (2b) that the
speaker was told that it is raining by someone else.
(2) a. Para-mu-sha-rqa-n=mi.
rain-CISL-PROG-PST-3=BPG
(Cuzco Quechua)
p= ‘It was raining.’
EV: speaker saw that p.
b. Es
it
soll
shall
regnen.
rain
(German)
p= ‘It is raining.’
EV: speaker is/was told that p.
Cross-linguistically, the types of source of information in Table 1 occur.
While epistemic modality and evidentiality are clearly distinct conceptually, they
are also closely related as the speaker’s evaluation of the truth of a proposition will
often be influenced by the way they have learnt about that proposition. Moreover,
it is not always possible to establish two distinct categories empirically in a given
language, as can be demonstrated with the English modal verb must. Consider (3).
1 Unless otherwise indicated, the Cuzco Quechua examples were elicited in interview sessions with
native speakers by the author. Abbreviations: 1,2,3: first, second, third person, ABL: ablative, ACC:
accusative, ADD: additive, BPG: best possible grounds, CAUS: causative, CISL: cislocative, COM:
comitative, COND: conditional, CONJ: conjectural, CONTR: contrastive, DIM: diminutive, DISC:
discontinuous, EV: evidential value, EXCL: exclusive, FUT: future, GEN: genitive, IMPR: impressive,
INCH: inchoative, INCL: inclusive, LOC: locative, NEG: negative, NX.PST: non-experienced past, PEI:
perceived evidence inferential, PL: plural, , POSS: possessive, PROG: progressive, PRT: participle,
PST: past, REFL: reflexive, REP: reportative, TOP: topic. Variables: p: proposition, s: speaker.
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Direct Indirect
Attested Inference Reported
Visual Results Secondhand
Auditory Reasoning Thirdhand
Other Sensory Folklore
Table 1 Types of source of information (Willett 1988)
(3) a. Context 1: Speaker sees people coming in with wet raingear
It must be raining.
b. Context 2: Speaker looks out the window and sees that it’s raining.
#It must be raining. (von Fintel & Gillies 2010)
Epistemic must expresses the speaker’s evaluation of p as necessarily true and it
is therefore an epistemic modal. But as (3b) demonstrates, it is infelicitous when
the speaker has direct evidence for p, and it can therefore also be classified as an
indirect evidential. More precisely, must has been argued to “signal that the prejacent
was reached through an inference rather than on the basis of direct observation or
trustworthy reports” (von Fintel & Gillies 2010).
From a theoretical perspective, if both evidentials and epistemic modals can be
analyzed in essentially the same way, then there is arguably no reason to distinguish
two categories (Matthewson 2010). The question then is which differences in their
semantics warrant the recognition of two separate categories, and which ones do
not. This paper concludes that, at a coarse-grained level of analysis, evidentials and
epistemic modals can both be treated as quantifiers over possible worlds in a modal
base. However, at a finer-grained level, important distinctions appear which warrant
keeping the two categories distinct.
1.2 Cuzco Quechua
The term Quechua refers to a family of languages spoken in the Andes region. The
variety studied here is Cuzco Quechua (CQ), spoken in the Department of Cuzco,
Peru. The basic word order of CQ is SOV but is flexible due to case marking. There
is widespread pro-drop of both subjects and objects. It is an agglutinative language
and possesses a large number of enclitics as well as derivational and inflectional
suffixes. Suffixes and enclitics are arranged in a template after the root as shown in
(4a), with a number of slots within each category, as illustrated in (4b).
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(4) a. ROOT–derivational–inflectional=enclitics
b. Mana=s
not=REP
tayta-y-ta=qa
father-1-ACC=TOP
rima-ri-chi-sqa-ku=pas=chu
speak-INCH-CAUS-NX.PST-PL=ADD=PL
‘Reportedly, they didn’t let my father talk’ (Cusihuaman 2001: 84)
2 The Cuzco Quechua evidentials
Evidentiality in CQ is mainly expressed with a set of enclitics, paradigmatically
illustrated in (5).2
(5) Para-mu-sha-n=mi/=si/=chá/=chu-sina.
rain-CISL-PROG-3=BPG/REP/CONJ/RES
p=‘It is raining.’
(i) Direct =mi/=n: s sees that it is raining.
(ii) Reportative, =si/=s: s was told that it is raining.
(iii) Conjectural, =chá: s conjectures that it is raining.
(iv) Partial evidence/inference from results, =chu-sina/=(chu)-suna: s infers
from available evidence that it is raining.
The evidential enclitics are a subset of the focus enclitics, and they cannot
co-occur with each other in a clause.
2.1 Best possible grounds/Direct =mi
The enclitic =mi indicates that the speaker has direct evidence in cases where
the described event is directly observable or otherwise directly accessible, as, for
example, in (6).
(6) Subrina-y-wan=mi
niece-1-COM=BPG
tiya-sha-n.
live-PROG-3
‘He is living with my niece.’
EV: s has seen that he is living with her niece. (conversation)
If the event described is not directly observable such as someone else’s future
plans or emotions, =mi is felicitous when the speaker has the “the next best thing”
to direct evidence, what Faller (2002) calls best possible grounds. For the examples
in (7), the best possible grounds would be a report by Inés herself; reports by others
or assumptions by the speaker do not license the use of =mi for such events.
2 CQ moreover has two past tense markers, one of which indicates that the speaker did not witness the
described event. This past tense is analyzed in Faller 2004.
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(7) a. Paqarin
tomorrow
Inés
Inés
Qusuq-ta=n
Cuzco-ACC-BPG
ri-nqa.
go-3.FUT
‘Inés will go to Cuzco tomorrow.’
EV: Inés told s that she will go to Cuzco tomorrow. (elicited)
b. Inés
Inés
llaki-ku-n=mi.
be.sad-REFL-3=BPG
‘Inés is sad.’
EV: Inés told s that she is sad. (elicited)
In this paper, I will only be concerned with examples involving direct evidence.
2.2 Reportative =si
The enclitic =si is used when the speaker has acquired the proposition expressed p
via reports from others, and is found in all types of genres, including conversation,
folktales and news reporting, (8).
(8) a. Congresista-manta=s
congressman-ABL=REP
haykuy-ta
enter-ACC
muna-n.
want-3
‘He wants to be a Congressman.’ (conversation)
b. Chaya-n=si
arrive-3=REP
ukuku
bear
uña=qa.
baby.animal=TOP
Punku-ta=s
door-ACC=REP
taka-ku-n,
knock-REFL-3
ch’in.
silent
‘The son of the bear arrived. He knocked on a door, silence.’
(Itier 1999: 44)
c. Wakin=si
some=REP
maqa-mu-n-ku
hit-CIS-3-PL
hayt’a-mu-n-ku.
kick-CIS-3-PL
‘Some hit and kicked (him).’ (news report)
2.3 Inferentials =chá and =chu-sina
CQ has two Inferential enclitics, which correspond to a cross-linguistically common
distinction between Inference from Reasoning and Inference from Results (Willett
1988). The Conjectural =chá can be used for inferences from a set of premises, (9),
as well as for speculation (see examples in section 4.1).
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(9) a. Mana=n
not=BPG
para
rain
kan=chu.
be=NEG
Kunan
now
wata=qa
year=TOP
mana=chá
not=CONJ
allin=chu
good=NEG
kuhichu
harvest
ka-nqa!
be-3.FUT
‘There is no rain. I guess/suppose/surely, the harvest this year will be
bad!’ (Cusihuaman 2001: 233)
b. Context: s knew the person referred to with ‘he’ in her childhood.
Suqta
six
chunka
ten
wata-yuq
year-POSS
ka-sha-n=chá.
be-PROG-3=CONJ
‘He must be sixty years (old).’ (conversation)
The enclitic combination =chu-sina, which I call the Perceived Evidence In-
ferential (PEI),3 is used for inferences based on some kind of observable, partial
evidence, often the result of the event described, as in (10).4 The difference between
=chu-sina and =chá can best be brought out by considering their applicability in
different contexts. Consultants agree that =chu-sina is preferred over =chá in a
context such as (10a), where the speaker has direct evidence for the premiss, but
=chá is preferred in a context where there is more reasoning involved as in (9b).
(10) a. Context: Marya looks very pale.
Unqu-sqa=chu-sina
sick-PRT=PEI
ka-sha-n-man.
be-PROG-3-COND.
‘She appears to be sick.’
3 The Conjectural =chá is regularly included in the set of evidentials in the literature, but =chu-sina
is not usually discussed as part of this set. However, as this enclitic can be used for inference from
results as well as from perceived evidence more generally, it also qualifies as an evidential. I adopt
the spelling of this enclitic in Cusihuaman 2001: 235. Another form encountered in written texts is
=chus hina.
4 From the description in Cusihuaman 2001 it appears that =chu-sina has wider applications, extending
also to inferences based on reports. Cusihuaman (2001: 235) gives the example in (i), which would
seem to make most sense in a context in which the speaker was told that they would go harvest
potatoes tomorrow. However, he gives no context, and it is therefore not clear what the basis for the
inference actually is.
(i) Paqarin-qa
tomorrow-TOP
papa-ta-suna
potato-ACC-PEI
aysa-mu-saqku.
harvest-CISL-1.FUT.EXCL
‘It seems we’ll be harvesting potatoes tomorrow.’ (Cusihuaman 2001: 235)
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b. Mama-cha-suna
mother-DIM-PEI
haqay-qa
that-TOP
hamu-shá-n.
come-PROG-3
‘That seems to be our mother who is coming.’
(Cusihuaman 2001: 235)
3 Previous analyses of evidentials within Kratzer’s framework of modality
Formal semantics accounts of evidentials tend to analyze them as epistemic modals,
that is, as quantifiers over possible worlds, with an added evidential condition, often
taken to be a presupposition.5 The first analysis of this kind was proposed by Izvorski
(1997) and has been adopted (with variations) by subsequent work such as Ehrich
2001; Matthewson et al. 2007; Rullmann et al. 2008 and others. My own previous
work on CQ evidentials (Faller 2002) has focussed on establishing whether or not
they contribute to the proposition expressed and argues that, in this language at least,
evidentials are speech act operators, adding a sincerity condition such as: Direct(p),
Report(p), or Conject(p), which intuitively are to be interpreted as “speaker has
directed/reported/conjectural evidence for p.” The purpose of the current paper is
to explore how the truth-conditions of these evidential sincerity conditions can be
captured within Kratzer’s (1981; 1987) framework of modality.
3.1 Kratzer’s doubly-relative account of epistemic modality
In Kratzer (1981; 1987), modal expressions are analyzed relative to two conversa-
tional backgrounds, a modal base f and an ordering source g, both provided by the
context. A conversational background is a function from worlds to sets of proposi-
tions (Kratzer 1981, 1987). Depending on what type of modal base is assumed in the
context, a modal receives an epistemic, deontic or other modal interpretation. For an
epistemic, the modal base provides the set of propositions known by the speaker in
w, (11).
(11) Epistemic conversational background fe:
For all w ∈W , fe(w) = {p | s knows p in w}
fe(w) projects a set of worlds
⋂
fe(w) that are accessible from w, namely those
worlds in which all the propositions known in w are true.
⋂
fe(w) is defined in (12).
(12)
⋂
fe(w) = {u ∈W | for all p ∈ fe(w), u ∈ p}
5 Formal semantic analyses of evidentials which do not analyze them as epistemic modals are Murray
2009 and Schenner 2008.
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An ordering source imposes an ordering on the worlds in the modal base. A
world v is a better world than u relative to a set of propositions A iff it verifies more
propositions in A than u.
(13) For all u,v ∈W , u<A v iff
{p | p ∈ A ∧ u ∈ p} ⊂ {p | p ∈ A ∧ v ∈ p}
The selection function max defined in (14) selects the set of maximal worlds
from a set of worlds W with respect to a set of propositions A (von Fintel & Iatridou
2005).6
(14) maxA(W ) = {w ∈W | ¬∃v ∈W [v<A w]}
An (epistemic) modal is then analyzed as quantifying over the best worlds in the
set of accessible worlds
⋂
f (w), relative to an ordering source g(w). That is, some
worlds, possibly including the actual world w, may be disregarded when drawing a
conclusion. The semantics for must can be given as (15).7
(15) Jmust(p)Kw,c, f ,g = 1 iff for all w′ ∈ maxg(w)(⋂ f (w)), JpKw′,c = 1.
The ordering source g(w) can, for example, be a set of assumptions about what
the world is typically like. To make things more concrete consider example (16).
(16) a. Context: a murder investigation in a Bavarian village. The investigator
knows the facts in (16b) and makes the assumptions in (16c).
b. fe(w) = {Only Jakl and Michl have a motive, Jakl has an alibi, . . . }
c. g(w) = {Murderers have a motive, people with alibis cannot commit a
murder, . . . }
With these background assumptions, she can justifiably conclude (17).
(17) Michl must be the murderer.
By using must to state her conclusion, the speaker signals that certain worlds
might have been excluded from consideration, and thereby leaves open the possibility
that the actual world might turn out to be one in which someone other than Michl
6 For the sake of a simpler definition of the selection function, I follow Izvorski (1997), von Fintel &
Iatridou (2005), and others, in making the Limit Assumption, according to which best worlds can
always be determined. See Kratzer 2010 for arguments for not making this assumption.
7 I adopt Portner’s (2009: 52) way of representing the truth conditions of modals. As is customary,
I assume that a linguistic expression is evaluated relative to a world w and a context c. For some
modals, the modal base f and ordering source g are also contextual parameters. For example, must
will receive an epistemic interpretation if f is set to an epistemic modal base.
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is the murderer. That is, with this semantics, must p does not entail p, thereby
capturing the intuition that must p is weaker, not stronger, than plain p.8
If the investigator had less firm grounds to conclude that Michl is the murderer,
she could instead conclude that Michl may be the murderer. In contrast to must, may
only requires there to be at least one world in the set of maximal worlds in which
Michl is the murderer, that is, its semantics is as in (18).
(18) Jmay(p)Kw,c, f ,g = 1 iff for some w′ ∈ maxg(w)(⋂ f (w)), JpKw′,c = 1.
In sum, a speaker using an epistemic modal claims that p necessarily or possibly
follows from a set of facts and a set of (normalcy) assumptions.
3.2 Evidentials as epistemic modals
Previous accounts of evidentials which adopt this framework take evidentials to be
just like epistemic modals but with an added evidential presupposition. The seminal
work in this area is Izvorski’s (1997), who analyzes the “perfect of evidentiality”
(PE) in a number of unrelated languages. The PE is a general indirect evidential and
can be used for inferences as well as reports. Izvorski (1997) proposes that the PE
asserts necessarily p in view of the speaker’s knowledge state, and presupposes that
the speaker has indirect evidence for p. She defines the modal base f and ordering
source g for the PE as in (19).
(19) a. f (w) = {p: s considers p indirect evidence in w}
b. g(w)= {p: s believes p with respect to the indirect evidence in w}
A similar semantics is given by Rullmann et al. (2008) for two St’át’imcets
inferentials, which are very similar to the two CQ inferentials, and a reportative
evidential. These evidentials share the assertion in (20d),9 that is, they are universal
quantifiers over an (epistemic) modal base. They differ in what they presuppose
about the accessible worlds, as shown in (20a-20c).
(20) a. General inferentialJk’aKc,w is only defined if c provides an epistemic modal base B s.t. for all
worlds w′, w′ ∈ B(w) iff the inferential evidence in w holds in w′.
8 There is some controversy as to whether this is the right semantics for English must. Stone (1994)
argues that the availability of evidence that decisively supports concluding p is the essential feature
that distinguishes sentences of the form must p from plain p (as well as from should p), not a set of
assumptions of normalcy. von Fintel & Gillies (2010) also highlight the evidential nature of must, but
go one step further in claiming that must p is not weaker than p, but entails p.
9 f in (20) is a context-dependent choice-function that potentially narrows down the modal base B
(which in their account is the set of accessible worlds, that is,
⋂
f (w) in the system adopted in this
paper)). Rullmann et al. (2008) use this function to account for the fact that modals in St’át’imcets do
not lexically fix a quantificational force.
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b. Perceived-evidence inferentialJ-an’Kc,w is only defined if c provides an epistemic modal base B s.t. for
all worlds w′, w′ ∈ B(w) iff the perceived evidence in w holds in w′.
c. Reportative evidentialJku7Kc,w is only defined if c provides an epistemic modal base B s.t. for
all worlds w′, w′ ∈ B(w) iff the relevant report made in w is made in w′.
d. Jk’aKc,w/J-an’Kc,w/Jku7Kc,w = λ f .λ p.∀w′[w′ ∈ f (B(w))→ p(w′)]
In this type of account then, the only difference between epistemic modals and
evidentials as well as between different types of evidentials is if and how their
presuppositions constrain the modal base.
4 Capturing the difference between inferential and non-inferential eviden-
tials
There are empirical differences between the four CQ evidentials (and between them
and evidentials of other languages) that would not be captured if one simply adopted
the existing evidentials-as-epistemic modals analyses. Firstly, with the two CQ
inferentials, as well as with the epistemic modals in English, p is presented as a
conclusion following from the evidence, but this is not the case with the CQ Direct
and Reportative. I propose that this can be captured by requiring a non-empty
ordering source for the inferentials, while the Direct and Reportative do not make
reference to an ordering source at all. Secondly, with the CQ Direct, but not the other
evidentials, the speaker presents themselves as knowing that p. This is also partially
accounted for by not involving an ordering source in the semantics of the Direct.
Thirdly, with the CQ Reportative, the speaker may not believe p or even believe ¬p.
This can be captured by using a non-epistemic modal base in its semantics. These
points will be addressed in more detail in the following sections.
First, however, I will briefly address the issue of whether the evidential meaning
is a presupposition. The main motivation for analyzing evidential meaning as
presuppositional is the fact that it can usually not be targeted by at-issue operators
and therefore does not contribute to at-issue content. For example, negation cannot
negate evidential meaning (see de Haan 1999 for cross-linguistic evidence, and
Faller 2002 on CQ). The truth of the evidential claim cannot be directly challenged
with That’s not true etc. (Faller 2002), and instead requires a more indirect way
such as Hey, wait a minute (von Fintel & Gillies 2010). That is, it looks like
evidential meaning projects like a presupposition. Most researchers acknowledge
that evidential meaning is not presuppositional in the sense that it is taken for granted,
however. That is, evidential meaning is usually new information. Without presenting
a full argument here, there are also issues with determining what exactly it is that
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projects. For example, the ‘presupposition’ of a negated sentence with a Direct
evidential is not I have direct evidence for p, as a standard presuppositional account
would predict, but I have direct evidence for ¬p.10 In Faller 2002, I analyzed the
CQ evidentials as illocutionary modifiers, introducing a sincerity condition, e.g.,
Direct(p). The illocutionary analysis situates the evidential meaning also in a not-at-
issue dimension and moreover allows us to capture the intuition that the evidential
claim is the main point of an evidential in a straightforward way. The analysis in
the following sections will therefore take the evidential claim to be part of the truth
conditions of the evidential sincerity conditions. The reader is asked to keep in mind,
however, that while sincerity conditions have truth conditions of their own, they do
not contribute to the truth conditions of the at-issue proposition p.
4.1 Inference and the ordering source
Recall that Rullmann et al. (2008) take the modal base of the General Inferential
to contain those worlds in which the inferential evidence in the actual world holds
(20a). However, it is not entirely clear what is meant by this. A proposition (or
more precisely the event/fact described by the proposition) cannot be inferential
evidence in general, it has to be inferential evidence for a particular proposition.
For example, the fact that there is an empty wine bottle in John’s room is inferential
evidence for the proposition John drank the wine, but not for John ate a guinea
pig, nor for There are empty wine bottles in John’s room (cf. von Fintel & Gillies
2010). In order to capture that a piece of evidence is only inferential evidence for a
particular proposition, one could perhaps make the modal base a function not only
on worlds but also propositions expressed. However, if we adopt a suggestion by
Portner (2009), there is a simpler and more elegant way to capture the nature of
inference. Note that the empty wine bottle in John’s room is inferential evidence
for John drank the wine only because it is a reasonable assumption that if there is
an empty wine bottle in someone’s room, then that person drank the wine. If we
were to assume in addition that John only drinks wine when he eats a guinea pig,
then the empty wine bottles would also constitute inferential evidence for John ate
a guinea pig. Assumptions of this kind are, however, precisely what the ordering
source is supposed to capture. Known facts such as There is an empty wine bottle in
John’s room become inferential evidence when they are taken in conjunction with
less well-founded assumptions of normalcy or rules of thumb. One way of capturing
the nature of inference is therefore to require that the ordering source be non-empty
(Portner 2009: 171). There is then no need to specify the propositions in the modal
10 von Fintel & Gillies (2010) solve this problem with English must by making its presupposition
roughly speaker does not have direct evidence (or a trust-worthy report) for p or ¬p, but it is not
clear how the presupposition of a Direct could be reformulated to get the projection facts right.
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base as constituting inferential evidence. If a speaker has direct evidence for p, then
the modal base directly supports p and the ordering source is empty. Conversely, if
the ordering source is not empty, then it follows that the modal base does not support
p directly.
There are of course also types of inference that do not involve normalcy assump-
tions or rules of thumb, for example, when p is entailed by the propositions in the
modal base. Such inferences can often be expressed using an inferential marker or
by asserting p directly. For example, the conclusion in (21) is expressed using must,
but it would have been equally felicitous to conclude we can deduce that the answer
is a positive number.
(21) We have a rule which states that the product of two negative numbers is a
positive number. Thus, if we have the specific case of (−3)× (−4) we can
deduce that the answer must be a positive number. (A General Rule which
helps us to deduce a specific case.) (E-Z geometry.com) (Werner 2006)
While the use of must in such cases does not indicate that one of the premises
is based on less than firm grounds, the speaker seems to leave open the possibility
that they might have made a mistake in their deduction when using must. As Stone
(1994) says, “the underlying motivations for using must reflect how the speaker takes
into account his own capacity for ignorance, error and oversight [my emphasis] and
the limited inferential resources of the addressee.” In Kratzer’s semantics we can
capture this by assuming that the relevant ordering source in such cases is I have
made no mistake. That is, the speaker sets aside those worlds in which mistakes
are made in calculating the conclusion, but by indicating that they did so, they at
the same time acknowledge that a mistake might nevertheless have occurred. The
difference between must p and plain p in such cases is then that must emphasizes the
inference process, which provides room for errors, while plain p carries no surface
signal of an inference having taken place, and leaves no room for error.
One further empirical piece of evidence suggesting that must points to the
inference process is the fact that it is not (entirely) compatible with the speaker
presenting themselves as knowing p before making the inferential statement.11
11 Though there seem to be special contexts in which (22a) becomes acceptable. For example, it is
improved if I know who ate the guinea pig is uttered with a special intonation that indicates that the
speaker has just realized that p is the case, possibly as a result of making the inference. Thanks to
Bernadette Plunkett (p.c.) for pointing this out at SPINFest 2. Note also that must is compatible with
the speaker coming to know p as a result of an inference (von Fintel & Gillies 2010). For example,
in the situation described in (i), Chris knows that the ball is in the box; must indicates only that this
knowledge was acquired via inference.
(i) Context: Chris’ ball can only be in one of three boxes, A, B, C. She looks in A, it’s not in
there. She looks in B, it’s not in there. She concludes:
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(22) a. I know who ate the guinea pig. ?? It must have been Juan.
b. I know who ate the guinea pig. It was Juan.
The fact that it is odd to assert knowing p and then to indicate that one infers
p, (22a), confirms that must indicates that the speaker has come to believe p as a
result of an inference process, which in the current analysis is captured by requiring
a non-empty ordering source.
Some evidentials and epistemic modals can be used for pure speculation or for
pointing out a logical possibility, neither of which involves the kind of inference
process described above. Nevertheless, such elements can still be classed as indirect
evidentials as they are infelicitous when the speaker has direct evidence for p and
because they point to a mental process as the source of information for p. The
English modal verb may is arguably an evidential of this type (von Fintel & Gillies
2010). Consider for example a situation in which I have no evidence or even a hunch
as to whether it is raining right now in Nijmegen. In this context, (23a) is felicitous.
But may can also be used in situations where there is some evidence in support of p.
For example, I know from experience that it rains quite a lot in Nijmegen in October,
and I might therefore issue the warning in (23b) to someone about to travel there.
(23) a. It may or it may not be raining in Nijmegen right now.
b. Better take an umbrella. It might be raining in Nijmegen.
In the current framework, such evidentials can be distinguished from proper
Inferentials by allowing but not requiring an ordering source. As will be discussed
in the next two subsections, the two CQ Inferentials differ in what conditions they
put on the ordering source. The Conjectural =chá allows the ordering source to be
empty, whereas the PEI =chu-sina requires a non-empty ordering source.
4.2 The Conjectural
The CQ Conjectural usually indicates that the speaker has arrived at p by reasoning
from a set of facts, though it is silent on how these facts were acquired. If the premiss
is made overt, as in (24) (repeated from (9a)), it may be marked by its own evidential.
(24) Mana=n
not=BPG
para
rain
kan=chu.
be=NEG
Kunan
now
wata=qa
year=TOP
mana=chá
not=CONJ
allin=chu
good=NEG
kuhichu
harvest
ka-nqa!
be-3.FUT
‘There is no rain. I guess/suppose/surely, the harvest this year will be bad!’
(ii) So, it must be in box C.
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Conjectural =chá is also felicitous in situations where the speaker is merely
speculating or pointing out a possibility. Thus, (25b) is fine in response to (25a) in a
situation where B has no idea whether Inés will come or not.
(25) a. A: Inés-cha=qa
Inés-DIM-TOP
hamu-nqa?
come-3.FUT
‘Will Inés come?’
b. B: Ichapas=chá,
maybe=CONJ,
mana-pas=chá.
not=ADD=CONJ
‘Maybe, maybe not.’
Thus, the Conjectural is quite similar in meaning to English may,12 both in not
requiring an ordering source and in being an existential quantifier. The main semantic
difference with may is that it is not variable with respect to the kinds of conversational
backgrounds it combines with, that is, =chá does not have deontic or bouletic uses,
for example. In fact, none of the CQ evidentials is variable in this sense, and they all
lexically fix the modal base and ordering source to a particular kind. For all but the
Reportative (see section 5.2), the modal base is epistemic. I therefore analyze the CQ
evidentials as asserting the existence of the relevant types conversational backgrounds
instead of having the context provide them. Like Izvorski (1997), I assume that
the ordering source of inferentials contains the speaker’s beliefs regarding their
evidence, that is, it is doxastic, gd(w). The semantics for the Conjectural is given in
(26).
(26) JConject(p)Kw,c = 1 iff there exists an epistemic modal base fe and a doxastic
ordering source gd such that there exists some w′ ∈ maxgd(
⋂
fe(w)), JpKw′,c
= 1.
The output of the ordering source for a particular world w may be empty, that
is, the speaker may not hold any relevant beliefs, thus accounting for examples like
(25). If it is not empty, that is, if the speaker relies on further assumptions, we get
a more properly inferential use of the Conjectural, such as (24). In this example,
the modal base contains the fact that there is no rain, and the ordering source the
assumption that the harvest will be bad if there is no rain, which may be based on
prior experience or general knowledge.
Given that no requirements are imposed the ordering source, the Conjectural is
a rather weak evidential. It is an evidential only by virtue of pointing to a mental
process as source of information, which, when the ordering source is empty, amounts
to nothing more than quantification over possible worlds that are compatible with
what is known in the actual world.
12 Though =chá is quite different from may in other respects, e.g., it cannot embed or otherwise be in
the scope of at-issue operators, whereas may can.
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4.3 Inference from perceived evidence
Turning now to =chu-sina, as mentioned in section 2, this evidential requires the
inference to be based on perceived evidence, often the result of the event described.
That is, this evidential imposes a restriction on how (some of) the premises in the
modal base were acquired. (27) (repeated from (10)) illustrates this use.
(27) Unqu-sqa=chu-sina
sick-PRT=PEI
ka-sha-n-man.
be-PROG-3-COND.
‘She appears to be sick.’
It is unclear at the moment whether it is possible for the speaker to entertain
both p and ¬p using =chu-sina as is the case with =chá, (25), and data from native
speakers still needs to be collected. However, a non-native but fluent speaker of
Cuzco Quechua gives the judgments indicated in (28).
(28) a. Unqu-sqa=chu-sina
sick-PRT=PEI
ka-sha-n-man.
be-PROG-3-COND
Mana-pas=chá.
not-ADD=PEI/=CHÁ.
‘She appears to be sick. (But) maybe she isn’t.’
b. Unqu-sqa=chu-sina
sick-PRT=PEI
ka-sha-n-man.
be-PROG-3-COND
#Mana-pas=chu-sina.
not-ADD=PEI/=CHÁ.
‘She appears to be sick. # (But) it appears she isn’t.’
The possibility of (28a) suggests that a speaker using =chu-sina indicates that
they have evidence in support of p, but that this evidence is not strong enough to
eliminate the possibility of ¬p. However, the speaker cannot claim that the available
evidence supports p as well as ¬p. That is, the speaker is not merely raising p as
a possibility, but reasoning from the available evidence, which can be captured in
the type of account developed here by requiring a non-empty ordering source. Since
¬p is not completely ruled out, as evidenced by (28a), the quantificational force is
existential.
PEI =chu-sina thus requires a modal base fpe that contains propositions describ-
ing events perceived by the speaker, and a non-empty doxastic ordering source that
contains assumptions that links these events to likely causes. The semantics for
=chu-sina can be given as in (29b).
(29) a. Perceptual modal base:
fpe(w) = {p | s perceived/-s the event described by p in w}
b. JPEI(p)Kw,c = 1 iff there exists a non-empty perceptual modal base
fpe(w)⊆ fe and a non-empty doxastic ordering source gd(w) s.t. there is
some w′ ∈ maxgd(
⋂
fpe(w)), JpKw′,c = 1.
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Applying this to example (27), the modal base contains the fact that she is pale,
and the ordering source the assumption that if people are pale then they are sick.
To summarize, this section has shown that the doubly-relative semantics de-
veloped by Kratzer to account for modality can fruitfully be applied to inferential
evidentials in CQ. Inferentials are evidentials by virtue of referring to a mental
reasoning process as the speaker’s source of information. This condition is met by
English may and the CQ Conjectural =chá even when these are used only to point out
a logical possibility. We get a stronger sense of an inference being performed when
these elements are used in conjunction with an ordering source. The PEI =chu-sina
is more obviously an inferential in that it specifies that a process of inference has
taken place involving premises in addition to what is perceived and known. It is also
an evidential proper in the sense that it tells us how the propositions in the modal
base were acquired. The two non-inferential evidentials of CQ can also be analyzed
as imposing restrictions on the modal base, as discussed in the next section.
5 Non-Inferential evidentials as restrictors of the modal base
Neither the Direct or the Reportative in CQ present p as a conclusion following
from a set of premises, there is no overt indication that speaker has performed an
inference. Since I have suggested in the previous section that the use of an ordering
source indicates an inference, the semantics for these two evidentials should not
include one. Their main evidential contribution is captured as a restriction on the
propositions in the modal base.
5.1 Direct
Consider an example like (30) (repeated from (6)). (30) asserts p as a fact and at the
same time conveys that the speaker has direct evidence for it. Upon hearing (30),
the hearer can assume that the speaker has seen first hand that ‘he’ is living with her
niece.
(30) Subrina-y-wan=mi
niece-1-COM=BPG
tiya-sha-n.
live-PROG-3
‘He is living with my niece.’
EV: s has seen that he is living with her niece. (conversation)
Unlike the CQ Inferentials, the CQ Direct has very little in common with typical
epistemic modals. Sentences containing =mi assert that p is true, not that p is
necessarily or possibly true, that is, they entail p. Moreover, they are compatible
with the speaker presenting themselves as knowing p, while epistemic modals are
not (see, e.g., (22)). Thus, (31) is fine.
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(31) Yacha-ni
know-1
pi-n
who-BPG
mikhu-rqa-n
eat-PST-3
quwi-ta
guinea.pig-ACC
chay-ta.
this-ACC
Juan=mi.
Juan=BPG
‘I know who ate the guinea pigs. It was Juan.’
EV: s saw that Juan ate the guinea pig.
This is unsurprising, given that perceptions are usually considered our most direct
link with states of affairs in the world. We take our perceptions to be knowledge
(Dancy 1985: 178), and propositions acquired via perception can directly be stated
as fact. Why would one then want to consider an analysis of direct evidentials as
quantifiers over epistemically accessible possible worlds? There are two reasons.
One, direct evidentials are epistemic in the sense that they tell us something about the
speaker’s epistemic state and not directly about how the world is. While perceptions
are our most direct access to the world, they can be mistaken. Imagine, for example,
an optical illusion in which two lines appear not to be parallel when in fact they are.
A speaker who is not aware of the illusion can legitimately assert that the two lines
are not parallel using the direct evidential, because that is what they see. Similarly
for hallucinations and other perceptual errors. However, once they have been made
aware of the illusion, the Direct is no longer felicitous, even if the speaker still sees
two non-parallel lines. A second reason to consider an epistemic analysis for the CQ
direct evidential is the fact that it actually allows for a minimal amount of reasoning
from the perceived evidence to p. However, this reasoning is very restricted and
must not involve any stereotypical or otherwise weak assumptions. The type of
inference permissible with =mi is illustrated in (32).
(32) a. Context: s has direct evidence that Marya bought two guinea pigs from
Inés and that she also bought three guinea pigs from Gloria in a separate
event.
b. Pisqa
five
quwi-ta=n
guinea.pig-ACC=BPG
ranti-rqa-n.
buy-PST-3
‘She bought five guinea pigs.’
EV: s saw that she bought five guinea pigs.
That is, =mi can be used for asserting an immediate entailment of the speaker’s
direct evidence. By “immediate” entailment I mean an entailment that is immediately
obvious to the speaker without them having to perform conscious calculations or
deductions. What is an immediate entailment is context and speaker dependent. A
school child who has just learnt the basics of arithmetics would probably not be
in a position to assert (32). Just like non-modalized sentences in English, which
can also be used to convey such “inferences”, CQ sentences with =mi do not admit
the possibility that the speaker might have made a mistake in their deduction (see
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discussion of (21)). Indeed, such sentences are used to convey knowledge. They do
not convey that any kind of inference was involved. That is, from hearing (32), the
hearer would have no idea whether Marya bought five guinea pigs in one transaction
or in two or more transactions. Thus, while =mi is compatible with this type of
minimal inference, it is not an inferential.13
I am aware of only one suggestion in the literature of analyzing direct, more
specifically visual evidentiality using Kratzer’s framework of modality, namely
Lecarme 2008. Lecarme suggests that visual evidentiality involves an epistemic
modal base and a perceptual ordering source, with the latter ordering the epistem-
ically accessible worlds in such a way that “in the most ideal or ‘normal’ of her
worlds, the speaker has DIRECT (visual) evidence” (Lecarme 2008: 218). However,
the introduction of an ordering source results in p not being entailed by a sentence
with a visual evidential, as the actual world might be amongst those eliminated by
it from the modal base. CQ sentences with the Direct =mi, however, entail p and
that the speaker has direct evidence in the actual world. I therefore analyze this
evidential as restricting the modal base. In particular, I propose that it, like the PEI
=chu-sina, requires a non-empty perceptual modal base fpe(w), that is, a modal
base that contains propositions describing the speaker’s perceptions. In contrast to
=chu-sina, however, the Direct =mi makes no reference to an ordering source.14
The semantics for Direct =mi is then (33).15
13 The notion of “immediate entailment” requires a formal definition and probably a better name, but I
will leave it for the time being as the intuitive notion as explained in the text. Note that “immediate
entailment” is not quite the same as von Fintel & Gillies’s (2010) notion of a modal base directly
settling the question of p, which they use to account for the indirectness requirement of epistemic
must and other modals. One way to define direct settledness is as in (i).
(i) A modal base f (w) directly settles whether p iff either there is a proposition in f (w) that
entails p or there is a proposition in f (w) that contradicts p.
Since direct settlement crucially relies on p being entailed or contradicted by a single, indepen-
dent proposition in the modal base, not, for example, by a conjunction of several propositions, this
will not work for the CQ Direct =mi. As we have seen in example (32), this evidential allows p to be
entailed by a conjunction of independent propositions in the perceptual modal base.
14 This in and of itself might be enough to capture the notion of an immediate entailment. As suggested
above, the ordering source can not only be used to indicate that the speaker is reasoning from less
than firm premises, but also to indicate that there is a possibility of a mistake having occurred during
the inference process. Thus, only people for whom an entailment is immediately obvious will not
hedge their conclusion by indicating such an ordering source. Further fieldwork will be needed to
determine whether an expert can use =mi to state conclusions that are not obvious to other people
using =mi. If so, this would support the analysis proposed here.
15 This semantics is very similar to Hintikka’s (1969) semantics for perception reports in (i).
(i) a perceives that p = in all possible states of affairs compatible with what a perceives it is the
case that p. (Hintikka 1969: 155)
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(33) JDirect(p)Kw,c = 1 iff there exists a non-empty perceptual modal base
fpe(w)⊆ fe s.t. for all w′ ∈⋂ fpe(w), JpKw′,c = 1.
Note that because we take our direct perceptions to constitute knowledge, a
perceptual modal base is a subset of an epistemic modal base, as I have already
assumed, but not commented on in (29).
5.2 Reportative
The Reportative =si is also not immediately obviously a quantifier over possible
worlds. Sentences containing it do not convey necessarily or possibly p but simply
p, and there is no indication of the speaker having performed an inference. Thus,
(34) (repeated from (8c)) says that someone told the speaker that some hit and kicked
“him”, not that this follows from what they were told.
(34) Wakin=si
some=REP
maqa-mu-n-ku
hit-CIS-3-PL
hayt’a-mu-n-ku.
kick-CIS-3-PL
‘Some hit and kicked (him).’
EV: s was told that some hit and kicked him.
Nevertheless, as with the Direct, the Reportative allows p to be the result of a
minimal amount of inference, and this again justifies a modal analysis of =si. For
example, in a context where I was told that Inés will go to Lima on Sunday and
asked whether she’ll be at a meeting in Cuzco on Sunday, I can say (35), which is an
inference based on the premiss that if a person is in Lima they cannot be in Cuzco.
(35) Mana=s
not=REP
kay-pi=chu
here-LOC=NEG
ka-nqa.
be-3.FUT
‘She won’t be here.’
EV: s was told that she won’t be here.
Only immediate inferences of this kind are allowed with the Reportative.
Previous analyses of reportative evidentials differ in how the modal base is
defined, thereby capturing an empirical difference between types of reportatives.
With some reportatives, the fact that someone said p is taken as evidence for p,
whereas others only convey that someone said p without that necessarily being
taken to provide support for the truth of p. The difference can be illustrated with
reportative adverbials in English. Compare (36a) with (36b) (Kratzer 2010).
Direct =mi differs from perception verbs in allowing a wider range of direct evidence, as
discussed in section 2, and in not contributing to the at-issue content (Faller 2002), but otherwise, it
seems appropriate to give it a similar semantics to perception verbs.
678
Cuzco Quechua evidentials
(36) a. Given the rumour, Roger must have been elected chief (#but I wouldn’t
be surprised if he wasn’t.)
b. According to the rumour, Roger must have been elected chief (but I
wouldn’t be surprised if he wasn’t.)
(36a) is true if the speaker considers the rumour to be reliable evidence on the
basis of which it can be concluded that Roger was elected chief. Hence it cannot be
continued with a statement that leaves open the possibility that p is false. In contrast,
(36b) is true if the rumour said that Roger was elected chief, regardless of whether
that is actually true or not.
The CQ Reportative =si is compatible with the speaker knowing/believing p as
well as with the speaker knowing/believing ¬p, or not having any opinion on the
truth of p at all. (37) illustrates the case where the speaker knows p to be false.
(37) Pay-kuna=s
(s)he-PL=REP
ñoqa-man=qa
I-ILLA=TOP
qulqi-ta
money-ACC
muntu-ntin-pi
lot-INCL-LOC
saqiy-wa-n,
leave-1O-3
mana-má
not-IMPR
riki
right
riku-sqa-yki
see-PRT-2
ni
not
un
one
sol-ta
Sol-ACC
centavo-ta=pis
cent-ACC=ADD
saqi-sha-wa-n=chu
leave-PROG-1O-3=NEG
‘They left me a lot of money, (but) that’s not true, as you have seen, they
didn’t leave me one sol, not one cent.’
The speaker of (37) first says using the Reportative that “they” left her a lot
of money, but then goes on to say that this is not true. Thus, the CQ Reportative
patterns with according to. However, the St’át’imcets Reportative can only be
used if the speaker believes p to be at least possible (Matthewson et al. 2007), and
therefore patterns with given that. Recall Rullmann et al.’s (2008) definition of the
presupposed modal base for the St’átimcets Reportative ku7 in (38a) and its assertion
in (38b) (repeated from (20)).
(38) a. Jku7Kc,w is only defined if c provides an epistemic modal base B such that
for all worlds w′,
w′ ∈ B(w) iff the relevant report made in w is made in w′.
b. Jku7Kc,w = λ f .λ p.∀w′[w′ ∈ f (B(w))→ p(w′)]
The modal base contains worlds in which the relevant report is made, and
because it is an epistemic modal base, in which the speaker’s beliefs are true. Thus,
a reportative statement with ku7 will be true only if the reported proposition is
compatible with what the speaker believes. Moreover, since the actual world is one
of the accessible worlds, p is claimed to be true in the actual world. This way of
constructing the modal base will not suit the CQ Reportative.
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A second way of constructing the modal base is to include the contents of the
relevant reports. This was, for example, proposed by Ehrich (2001) for the reportative
uses of the German modal verb sollen.16 In recent work, Kratzer (2010) has called
such conversational backgrounds informational, as they represent the information
conveyed by reports and other sources of information.
Let us define an informational reportative background fr(w) as a function from
worlds to propositions that represent the content of what is said, as in (39).
(39) fr(w) = {p | p is the content of what is said in w}
With this type of modal base, the semantics of CQ Reportative can be defined as
in (40). As mentioned above, the CQ Reportative does not indicate that the speaker
is making an inference, that is, on the analysis proposed here, there is no ordering
source involved.
(40) JReport(p)Kw,c = 1 iff there exists a non-empty reportative informational
modal base fr(w) s.t. for all w′ ∈⋂ fr(w), JpKw′,c = 1
The modal base here does not necessarily include the actual world, because a
report that p might have been made in the actual world without p being true. That
is, this analysis correctly captures the fact that with the CQ Reportative, the speaker
is not committed to any degree to p, and indeed, may believe that p is false. Such
a modal base is then not epistemic, as it does not have to be compatible with the
speaker’s beliefs.
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed an analysis of the CQ evidential enclitics using Kratzer’s
framework of double-relative modality. The different types of conversational back-
grounds offered by this framework have proven very useful in capturing the dif-
ferences between the individual evidentials. One major distinction can be drawn
between inferential and non-inferential evidentials. The proposal put forward here
is that Inferentials rely on an ordering source, whereas non-inferential evidentials
do not make reference to this type of conversational background. This distinction
captures the empirical observation that Inferentials point to a conscious inferential
process on part of the speaker as the source of information, which may be based on
possibly non-factual assumptions and which may have the potential to be faulty in
some way. In contrast, non-inferential evidentials, while compatible with a restricted
16 Ehrich (2001: 168) characterizes the accessible worlds for reportative sollen as those that specify the
statements of X (“die die Behauptungen von X [spezifizieren]”), where X is a particular, possibly
unspecified, source.
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type of inference, do not indicate that such an inference is involved. Instead, they
point to the way the propositions in the modal base were acquired. As we have
seen the PEI =chu-sina has elements of both: it restricts the propositions in the
modal base to those that were perceptually acquired and indicates the embedded
proposition is the result of an inference.
Turning now to the question of whether evidentials can be subsumed under
the category of epistemic modals, my answer would be ‘no’. If we assume that
an epistemic element is one that makes reference to an individual’s or group’s
knowledge, here captured as an epistemic modal base, then the Reportative is clearly
not an epistemic element. In contrast, the Inferentials and the Direct =mi are. Now, I
am somewhat hesitant to call Direct =mi an epistemic modal, though it is clearly an
epistemic operator, as it does not express necessity in the same way as must does, for
example. In the same vein, I would hesitate to call verbs of knowledge or perception
epistemic modals. However, my hesitation here might simply be a consequence
of the fact that it is usually inferentials that are discussed as the prime examples
of epistemic modals. Thus, if we define an epistemic modal as a quantifier over
epistemically accessible worlds, then the Direct =mi, along with verbs of knowledge
and perception, is also an epistemic modal. Are epistemic modals a subclass of
evidentials? In section 4.1, I said that epistemic modals like must and may are
evidentials by virtue of not being compatible with the speaker having direct evidence
for p and by pointing to a mental process as the source of information. However,
if we include verbs of knowledge and expressions of degree of certainty such as
perhaps or certainly in the category of epistemic modals, then we have examples
of epistemic modals that are not evidentials, as these do not give any indication
about what type of evidence the speaker has for p. Thus, with a definition of
epistemic modals as quantifiers over epistemically accessible worlds, the categories
of evidentials and epistemic modals are distinct but overlapping categories.
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